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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Chad Stuart Ritchie appeals from his conviction for grand theft.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Ritchie with grand theft by possession of a stolen car with a
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 30-31, 61-62.) A jury found him guilty of the
grand theft charge after a trial. (R., p. 211.) The district court found Ritchie to be a
persistent violator after a court trial on the enhancement. (R., pp. 207-08.) The district
court imposed a sentence of 20 years with five years determinate. (R., pp. 247-49.) Ritchie
filed a notice of appeal timely from entry of the judgment. (R., pp. 253-55.)
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ISSUES
Ritchie states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Is there a fatal variance in this case because the information
specified that Mr. Ritchie committed grand theft by possession of
stolen property with only one mental state, while the court instructed
the jury that it could convict Mr. Ritchie if he had any of the three
mental states and the prosecutor told the jury that it [sic] had proven
Mr. Ritchie had two mental states[?]

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a unified term
of twenty years, with five years fixed, for grand theft by possession
of stolen property?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Ritchie failed to show a variance, much less a variance rising to the level of
fundamental error?
2.

Has Ritchie failed to show the district court abused its sentencing discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Ritchie Has Failed To Show A Variance Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Ritchie argues there was a variance between the charge and the jury instructions

that amounts to fundamental error. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.) The state charged Ritchie
with grand theft by possession of a stolen Ford Taurus “with the intent to deprive the owner
permanently of the use or benefit of the property.” (R., pp. 30-31.) The jury instructions
included all three statutory methods of proving the element of intent to permanently
deprive, specifically:
(a) the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the use
or benefit of the property, or
(b) the defendant knowingly used, concealed or abandoned the property in
such manner as to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of
the property, or
(c) the defendant used, concealed, or abandoned the property knowing that
such use, concealment or abandonment would have probably deprived the
owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property.
(R., p. 232.) Application of the relevant law shows no variance, much less fundamental
error.

B.

Standard Of Review
A claim of variance asserted for the first time on appeal is reviewed under the

fundamental error standard. State v. Calver, 155 Idaho 207, 214, 307 P.3d 1233, 1240 (Ct.
App. 2013).

An appellate court will reverse an unobjected-to error only when the

defendant establishes the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any
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additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome
of the trial proceedings. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).

C.

Giving The Jury All Three Definitions Of The Intent To Permanently Deprive
Element Of Grand Theft Were A Variance, And Even If It Were Ritchie Has Failed
To Show Fundamental Error
“A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different

from those alleged in an indictment.” Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979).
To prevail on a variance claim, the defendant must show a “deprivation of his ‘substantial
right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury.’”
United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140 (1985) (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212, 217 (1960)). A variance is fatal if it amounts to a constructive amendment. State
v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 2003).
A constructive amendment, as opposed to a mere variance, occurs if a variance
alters the charging document to the extent the defendant is tried for a crime of a greater
degree or a different nature. Id.; State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566, 861 P.2d 1225, 1231
(Ct. App. 1993).
The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon
the obvious requirements (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed
as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his
defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and
(2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same
offense.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935). See
also -----------State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44,
- --47, 175 P.3d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 2007). If a defendant claims lack of notice, courts must
determine whether the record suggests the possibility that the defendant was misled or
embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his or her defense. State v. Windsor, 110
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Idaho 410, 418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1985). The double jeopardy problem arises when
the evidence of acts not included in the charge would support a separately chargeable
crime. See State v. Ormesher, 154 Idaho 221, 224-25, 296 P.3d 427, 429-30 (Ct. App.
2012) (variance created by evidence of additional acts of sexual touching in single course
of conduct did not give rise to risk of additional prosecution).
Review of the applicable law and record shows no fatal variance, and thus no
fundamental error. Theft by possession of stolen property is defined as follows:
(4) A person commits theft when he knowingly receives, retains, conceals,
obtains control over, possesses, or disposes of stolen property, knowing the
property to have been stolen or under such circumstances as would
reasonably induce him to believe that the property was stolen, and
(a) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit
of the property; or
(b) Knowingly uses, conceals or abandons the property in such
manner as to deprive the owner permanently of such use or benefit;
or
(c) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use,
concealment or abandonment probably will deprive the owner
permanently of such use or benefit.
I.C. § 18-2403(4). Under Idaho law, an information charging theft is “sufficient if it alleges
that the defendant stole property of the nature or value required for the commission of the
crime charged without designating the particular way or manner in which such property
was stolen or the particular theory of theft involved.” I.C. § 18-2409(1).
The statute provides for alternative definitions of the intent to permanently deprive
element, not three different crimes of theft. See State v. Cheney, 116 Idaho 917, 919, 782
P.2d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 1989) (“We believe that ‘driving’ and being in ‘actual physical
control’ of a motor vehicle are alternative ‘circumstances’ under which the crime of driving
under the influence may be charged.”); State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 57, 740 P.2d 1039,
1042 (Ct. App. 1987) (six “alternative ‘circumstances’” under which rape could be
5

committed “describes an alternative element,” not “six different crimes”). See also State
v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 977-78, 188 P.3d 912, 919-20 (2008) (principal and aider and
abettor are alternative methods of committing a single offense); State v. Southwick, 158
Idaho 173, 181, 345 P.3d 232, 240 (Ct. App. 2014) (“in cases involving alternative means
of meeting statutory elements, the jury need only agree upon the bottom line”). Because
all three definitions fit the same element, the allegation Ritchie had the “intent to deprive
the owner permanently of the use or benefit” of the car is sufficient to charge intent to
permanently deprive under any of the three definitions.
Even if pleading the element of intent to permanently deprive generally were not
sufficient to plead all three definitions, inclusion of all three definitions in the jury
instruction was not fundamental error. First, there was no fatal variance because Ritchie
bore no risk of being convicted of a crime of a greater degree or a different nature than the
grand theft with which he was charged. Jones, 140 Idaho at 49, 89 P.3d at 889. There was
only one theft of one car regardless of how Ritchie’s intent to permanently deprive was
manifest. Moreover, Ritchie was not embarrassed in his trial preparation. Nothing in the
record suggests he was unprepared to meet evidence that his knowing use of the stolen car
demonstrated his intent to permanently deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the car.
Second, neither the alleged constitutional violation nor the reason no objection was
asserted at trial is clear in the record. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Ritchie
was convicted of a crime other than the one charged, or that he was surprised and his
defense was compromised. Nor does the record make clear that the lack of an assertion
that Ritchie lacked notice and was thus prejudiced was not because Ritchie in fact did not
believe he lacked notice or had been prejudiced.
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Finally, there is no reason to believe Ritchie was prejudiced. The evidence that
Ritchie possessed the stolen car with intent to permanently deprive the owner of its use or
benefit is overwhelming. The Taurus was taken from the front of the owner’s house when
he inadvertently left the keys in it. (Tr., p. 130, L. 18 – p. 132, L. 7.) The police obtained
jail call recordings of calls made about six days after the theft in which Ritchie told an
inmate that he was living in a “stolen car.” (Tr., p. 145, L. 25 – p. 146, L. 22; State’s
Exhibit 1B (p. 4).) In another conversation about 12 days after the theft he talked about
giving people rides and needing to “get my shit out of this fucking car in case I need to be
able to leave it.” (Tr., p. 148, L. 14 – p. 149, L. 25; State’s Exhibit 2B (pp. 4, 11).) About
15 days after the theft officers found the stolen Taurus. (Tr., p. 151, L. 8 – p. 152, L. 15.)
They watched the car and spotted Ritchie put bags in the trunk and get in the car with a
key. (Tr., p. 152, L. 17 – p. 153, L. 15; p. 170, L. 19 – p. 172, L. 23.) Ritchie had the key
to the Taurus in his pocket when he was arrested. (Tr., p. 173, Ls. 2-10.) Ritchie also had
“a lot of property” belonging to him in the car. (Tr., p. 175, Ls. 11-19.) In monitored jail
phone calls he made after his arrest, Ritchie talked about taking things out and putting
things in the car when he got arrested and that he had a “strategy” to fight the charge based
on a claim the car was “borrowed” (State’s Exhibit 3B (pp. 2-4), 4B (p. 2)); he stated that
he hoped to get the charge reduced to joyriding, in part because the car had “more gas in it
than when I got it” (Exhibit 4B (p. 3)). Ritchie’s defense in his closing argument was that
the state had not proved it was him in the phone calls. (Tr., p. 208, L. 25 – p. 210, L. 6.)
The jury’s rejection of that defense had nothing to do with the definitions of the intent to
permanently deprive element. Nothing in this record supports an inference that Ritchie
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was surprised or his defense compromised by inclusion of all the alternative definitions of
the intent to permanently deprive element in the instruction.
Ritchie argues that the alleged error was fundamental. He argues that the alleged
variance “deprived [him] of notice and thus due process.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) He
does not articulate how the alleged variance deprived him of notice or prejudiced the
preparation of his defense, however. He fails to claim, much less show on the record, that
he “was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his defense.” Windsor,
110 Idaho at 418, 716 P.2d at 1190.
He also argues the error was clear “from the information, jury instruction, and
closing argument.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) Again, however, this claim is merely
conclusory and fails to show that he was denied notice and that his defense was
compromised. Moreover, his conclusory claim that “[n]o reasonable trial strategist would
elect not to object” is also not supported by a record which does not show Ritchie in fact
lacked notice and further shows no tactical gain to be had by keeping out two theories of
intent to permanently deprive (even if an objection would have been sustained) where the
evidence of intent to permanently deprive is so overwhelming.
Finally, Ritchie argues that he was prejudiced because the theory that he knowingly
used, concealed or abandoned the property in such manner as to deprive the owner
permanently of such use or benefit “requires a lesser showing by the State.” (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 8-9.) The state is confident in asserting that it had the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt under any of the definitions of the intent to permanently deprive element,
but perhaps Ritchie’s argument is just unclear. In proving Ritchie’s intent to permanently
deprive under any definition the state certainly would have used the same evidence,
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evidence including Ritchie’s statements that he knew the car was stolen; that he was using
it to drive different places and to give people rides; had put gas in it; was at one point living
in it; filled it with his property; and possessed the key. In addition, nothing in the record
indicates the jury would have concluded the state failed to prove Ritchie’s intent to
permanently deprive but for being instructed on the alternate definitions of that element.
Ritchie’s argument fails on all prongs of the fundamental error test. He has shown
nothing in the record suggesting his defense was compromised by the alleged variance.
The alleged lack of notice and resulting prejudice is not clear on the record, and therefore
the reason no objection was made is not clear. Finally, Ritchie has also failed to show
prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Ritchie’s claim of fundamental
error must be rejected.

II.
Ritchie Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed a sentence of 20 years with five years determinate upon

Ritchie’s conviction of grand theft, enhanced for being a persistent violator. (Tr., p. 233,
Ls. 7-25; R., pp. 247-49.) Ritchie argues the sentence was excessive because he had a
difficult upbringing, has been diagnosed with ADHD and depression, recognized his drug
problems at sentencing and stated a desire to address them, and expressed accountability
for his actions. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-11.) The record supports the district court’s
exercise of discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard

considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d
387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of
the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v.
Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits,
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State
v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this
Court considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3)
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151
Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

C.

The Record Supports The District Court’s Exercise Of Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must

establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v.
Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the
appellant met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision
to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that
the determinate portion will be the period of actual incarceration. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726,
170 P.3d at 391. To establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that
10

reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell,
144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. The “primary objective” of sentencing is “the protection
of society.” State v. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 376 P.3d 744, 748 (2016).
The district court applied the relevant factors, focusing on community protection in
light of Ritchie’s extensive criminal record. (Tr., p. 231, L. 10 – p. 232, L. 16.) It was
considering a sentence that would include 10 years fixed but, based upon the arguments of
Ritchie’s counsel regarding his rehabilitation potential and the state’s “generous”
recommendation, elected to impose the 20 years with five years determinate recommended
by the prosecutor. (Tr., p. 232, L. 10 – p. 233, L. 14.)
The record supports the district court’s exercise of discretion. Ritchie has a
decades-long criminal history that includes multiple prior thefts and five prior felony
convictions. (PSI, pp. 5-13.) He has spent years on probation or incarcerated, yet shows
no signs of altering his behavior. (Id.) Ritchie’s argument that factors he believes are
mitigating show an abuse of discretion do not show error on this record.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 9th day of February, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of February, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
MAYA P. WALDRON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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